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Robotic Speakers and Human Listeners 
Helen Norton* 
In their forthcoming book, Ron Collins and David Skover propose 
that we do—and should—protect speech not so much because of its value 
to speakers but instead because of its affirmative value to listeners. 
Defining and describing that value very broadly as “utility,” they then 
conclude that robotic speech deserves the First Amendment’s coverage, 
and often its protection, precisely because of its great utility to listeners: 
It should be immaterial to free speech treatment that a robot is not a 
human speaker. It should be irrelevant that a robot cannot fairly be 
characterized as having intentions. It should be beside the point that 
a robot does not engage in a dialogic exchange to express 
propositions or opinions. For constitutional purposes, what really 
matters is that the receiver experiences robotic speech as meaningful 
and potentially useful or valuable.1 
In earlier work (first with Toni Massaro2 and then with Toni and 
Margot Kaminski3), my co-authors and I similarly concluded that little in 
First Amendment law poses a barrier to First Amendment coverage of 
robotic speech. Although this conclusion feels counterintuitive to many, it 
stems much more from the contemporary state of First Amendment law 
than from the nature of robots or artificial intelligence (AI) themselves.4 
Indeed, most “positive” free speech theories value, and thus urge the 
protection of, expression because it provides certain affirmative benefits 
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to listeners: expression can facilitate listeners’ democratic self-
governance, it can enlighten them through exposure to a marketplace of 
ideas and knowledge, and it can inform their choices and thus enable the 
exercise of their individual autonomy.5 Even “negative” free speech 
theory, which emphasizes the dangers of the government’s control of 
expression rather than the affirmative value of that speech in its own right, 
seeks primarily to protect listeners from the government.6 In short, both 
positive and negative free speech theories (as well as the Supreme Court’s 
contemporary First Amendment doctrine that draws upon them) protect 
“listeners’ interests in free speech outputs—rather than speakers’ 
humanness or humanity—in ways that make it exceedingly difficult to 
place AI speakers beyond the First Amendment’s reach.”7 
So, if we assume that the First Amendment is largely, if not entirely, 
about serving listeners’ interests in speech—in other words, that it’s 
listeners all the way down—what would a listener-centered approach to 
robotic speech require? To be sure, robotic speech can offer great value to 
human listeners.8 But here I want to briefly discuss the complicated and 
sometimes even dark side of robotic speech from a listener-centered 
perspective. 
More specifically, cheap and plentiful speech—and robotic speech is 
increasingly an important source of cheap and plentiful speech9—is of 
great utility to many listeners. But there is a dark side too, as cheap and 
plentiful speech sometimes poses new dangers to certain listeners and to 
the public more broadly. 
Rick Hasen, for example, observes that “[c]heap speech has 
dramatically lowered costs for those who want to draw on people’s fears 
and rile them up for violent purposes.”10 Julie Cohen uses the term 
“infoglut” to describe this era of cheap and plentiful speech fueled by 
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technology, along with its attendant and often unanticipated dysfunctions: 
“Information abundance also enables new types of power asymmetries 
that revolve around differential access to data and to the ability to capture, 
store, and process it on a massive scale.”11 And as Tim Wu explains: 
It is no longer speech itself that is scarce, but the attention of listeners. 
Emerging threats to public discourse take advantage of this 
change. . . . The low costs of speaking have, paradoxically, made it 
easier to weaponize speech as a tool of speech control. The 
unfortunate truth is that cheap speech may be used to attack, harass, 
and silence as much as it is used to illuminate or debate.12 
Cheap speech, the democratization of information, and infoglut: 
these and other terms all describe abundant speech of the sort that robots 
and other technological developments increasingly make possible. While 
such inexpensive and plentiful speech may seem to maximize listener 
utility, the concerns expressed by Cohen, Hasen, and Wu (among others) 
show how more speech is not always better for listeners. Indeed, 
sometimes speakers “weaponize” cheap speech to threaten listeners—for 
example, by exploiting information and power advantages that increase 
their capacity to deceive, manipulate, and coerce their listeners.  
Speakers’ motives for exploiting listeners are many and complicated: 
for example, speakers may seek to entertain themselves (and others), to 
make money, or to influence political outcomes.13 Consider, for example, 
the evidence that Russian bots targeted the American electorate as part of 
a campaign to manipulate the 2016 elections: 
Bots can serve many purposes, some beneficent and others 
nefarious . . . . Of greatest relevance here, bots can spread 
information or misinformation, and can cause topics to “trend” online 
through the automated promotion of hashtags, stories, and the like. 
During the 2016 campaign, the prevalence of bots in spreading 
propaganda and fake news appears to have reached new heights.14 
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Tim Wu points to China to further illustrate how speakers can exploit 
cheap and abundant speech, or “infoglut,” to threaten listeners’ interests: 
“What [researchers] have discovered is a regime less intent on stamping 
out forbidden content, but instead focused on distraction, cheerleading, 
and preventing meaningful collective action.”15 
Furthermore, sometimes listeners themselves are a threat to other 
listeners. Indeed, listeners’ interests—both short- and long-term—often 
conflict. Trolling provides an illustration. As Whitney Phillips explains, 
“[T]rolling can be nasty, outrageous business. That is, in fact, the entire 
exercise: to disrupt and upset as many people as possible, using whatever 
linguistic or behavioral tools are available.”16 Although the trolls’ targets 
find this speech of no value and often of great harm, some number of the 
trolls’ listeners include other members of the trolling community who 
consider trolling to be enjoyable precisely because others find it so 
unpleasant. As I have written elsewhere: “[T]hat the nasty and pernicious 
features of certain speech can strip it of utility for some listeners is 
precisely why other listeners enjoy it . . . . Those who are quick to see 
utility in contested speech may well be those least likely to experience, 
and thus see, its harm.”17 Relatedly, different listeners experience hate 
speech in different ways and thus disagree about its value. Even though 
hate speech is of no utility to its targets, some bystanders apparently enjoy 
it. Indeed, many listeners enjoy hateful, false, and outrageous speech when 
it speaks to and confirms their pre-existing preferences, fears, and 
grievances.18 
So far, I have discussed the dark side of robotic speech for its human 
listeners. I next consider what it would mean to take listeners’ interests 
seriously in the context of robotic and other technologically cheap and 
plentiful speech. 
Contemporary First Amendment theory and doctrine make clear that 
we sometimes privilege listeners’ First Amendment interests by protecting 
speech, and sometimes by regulating it.19 At times, for example, the 
government imposes duties of honesty, accuracy, or disclosure upon 
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certain speakers to protect listeners’ informational and autonomy interests. 
Recall, for instance, the commercial speech context, where listeners’ 
interests as consumers in receiving truthful and non-misleading 
information about legal commercial transactions justify both the 
protection and regulation of commercial expression to serve those 
interests.20 Consider too the professional speech setting, in which 
governments sometimes protect listeners’ interests by prohibiting 
professionals’ inaccurate or otherwise harmful speech to their clients and 
patients, and by requiring certain truthful disclosures.21 
We can similarly understand the First Amendment to protect robotic 
speech that is of value to its listeners, while permitting the government to 
regulate robotic speech to protect listeners from coercion, deception, and 
discrimination. In short, First Amendment doctrine retains a human focus 
when it attends both to the value and the dangers of robotic speech to its 
human listeners.22 
Of course, hard questions remain in determining exactly when and 
how to regulate robotic speech to protect listeners’ interests—questions 
we will be grappling with for years to come.23 And, to be sure, sometimes 
the answer may not be legal regulation, as we may instead choose to rely 
on markets, norms, or architecture to protect listeners’ interests.24 
 But to close with one specific doctrinal proposal, I suggest that we 
understand the First Amendment to permit the government to privilege 
listeners’ interests by requiring the truthful disclosure of expression’s 
robotic origin.25 Expression’s source is extremely valuable information 
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upon which listeners often rely to gauge a message’s quality and 
credibility.26 Claims to anonymity or pseudonymity (i.e., speakers’ efforts 
to conceal and sometimes even lie about their expression’s actual source) 
generally serve speakers’ interests at the expense of their listeners.27 In 
short, the more information about the source of a message, the better for 
listeners. Indeed, because the source of speech is so valuable to listeners, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld compelled disclosures—that is, 
laws that require campaign contributors and speakers to disclose their 
identities to the public—in the campaign speech context where it is 
otherwise so loath to permit regulation.28 
As many of the speakers in this Symposium emphasized, robots are 
disruptive in many ways, for good and for ill.29 More specifically, the 
cheap and plentiful speech that robots help make possible can disrupt 
democratic institutions (again, for both good and for ill) and will likely 
disrupt First Amendment doctrine as well.30 Just as criminal and tort law 
will respond to the new ways in which robots cause harm, so too will First 
Amendment doctrine respond to the new challenges generated by robotic 
speech. Recall that the First Amendment doctrine of the early twenty-first 
century is almost unrecognizable from the First Amendment doctrine of 
the early (and even the late):31 change will come, even if we are not yet 
sure what form it will take. 
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And perhaps the challenges of robotic speech will inspire and enable 
a return to a truly listener-centered approach to some of these challenges 
in other, more traditional settings. As many thoughtful commentators have 
observed, although the commercial speech doctrine originally sought to 
privilege listeners’ interests as consumers, commercial and other speakers 
now increasingly exploit that doctrine to attack regulations intended to 
protect listeners from speakers who enjoy advantages of power and 
information over them.32 Examples include powerful speakers’ challenges 
to privacy laws that constrain commercial entities’ use of information for 
marketing purposes and challenges to laws that require corporate and 
commercial actors to make certain truthful disclosures.33 As my co-authors 
and I earlier suggested, “[t]he prospect of free speech rights for strong AI 
speakers might encourage useful clarification of the roles of human 
listeners and of speech harms in U.S. free speech theory and doctrine 
today.”34 
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